

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XI. No. 2.]

LONDON, SATURDAY, JANUARY 10, 1807.

[PRICE 10D.]

"That, in case the crown and imperial dignity of this realm shall hereafter come to any person, not being a native of this kingdom of England, this nation be not obliged to engage in any war for the defence of any dominions or territories, which do not belong to the crown of England, without the consent of parliament."—ACT. WILLIAM III; 12th and 13th, Chap. 2.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. (Continued from p. 22.—In order to facilitate the work of reference to the quotations and remarks, which I may think it necessary to publish upon subjects that come before parliament, I propose to insert, in future, at the head of each article of this sort, a list of the subjects touched upon, in the same manner as the following list, which will be found to be a table of contents to the article we are now entering upon.—I. *West India Sugar*. II. *The Uti Possidetis*. III. *Hanover*. IV. *Flourishing State of the Finances*.—I. On the 30th ultimo Lord Temple moved for a committee of the House of Commons, to inquire, whether, on account of the very low price of West India Sugar, it would not be proper to pass a law to permit the use of such sugar in the distilleries; whereupon Mr. Baker, one of the members for Hertfordshire, expressed a hope that nothing of this sort would be done precipitately, lest the corn-growers should be injured by the probable reduction which such a measure would produce in the price of corn. In my last number, at page 24, the reader has seen a very able letter upon this question. The prices of sugar are there stated; and a very fair representation is made of the distressed situation of the sugar-planters. The statement, in the same letter, respecting the purchase of French brandy for the navy does not appear to me to carry in it conviction so clear as the writer evidently anticipates; for I cannot easily perceive *how* we should distress the enemy by excluding from our use any of the necessaries of life (and such, in this case, we must consider brandy) which are now supplied to our navy from his soil and labour. I do not say, that the argument, here referred to, is not a good one; I only say, that it has failed to produce conviction in my mind. But, in combating the apprehensions of Mr. Baker, the writer is, as far as he goes, completely successful. After all that we have heard about the high price of corn; after all that we have seen as to the effects of a scanty supply; knowing as we

do, that, upon an average of years, we exchange annually more than a million's worth of our other productions for corn; after all this, one would hardly have expected to hear a member of the House of Commons, who acts for the whole nation as well as for his immediate constituents, expressing his alarm lest the price of corn should be reduced. What, however, appears still more extraordinary, is, that any man, much less a legislator, should suppose, or should argue as if he supposed, that corn being at a high price was a circumstance *advantageous to the growers of corn*. Generally speaking, there is no trade which derives advantage from the circumstance of high price in the articles of which it treats. Partial instances of advantage in this way frequently occur; but, take time to reflect upon the natural consequences of *substitution* and *competition*; and you will find, that it is impossible that the circumstance of high price should be generally and permanently advantageous to the persons employed in the producing or the manufacturing or the vending of any articles of common necessity, use, or convenience. If this be true with respect to all articles of common traffic, how peculiarly evident is the truth, when applied to the article of corn? The price of corn is the regulator of the prices of all other articles applicable to the common concerns of life: for, though it may be said, that men eat only *wheat*, and that, therefore, the high price of barley and oats cannot make it necessary to raise the price of the labour; yet, if barley be dear, bacon must be dear, or, if bacon be not raised, mutton and beef will be dearer on that account. If oats be dear, the labour of the horse is raised in price; and, if you could keep the horse upon hay and straw, there would be so much less hay and straw for cattle and sheep. Corn is, therefore, the regulator of prices; and, if the grower of corn sell it at five shillings a sack, he is just as well off as if he sold it for ten shillings a sack; because, viewing, observe, prices in their *general* and *permanent* effect, his land, his seed, and his labour, cost him

but half as much money in the former as they cost in the latter case; and, as to what he may clear and *lay by*, a guinea laid by in a country where corn sells at five shillings a sack is equal to two guineas laid by in a country where corn sells at ten shillings a sack. How, groundless, then, are the fears of Mr. Baker! He is too honest and independent a man to have feigned an alarm for the purpose of humouring the prejudices of his constituents; or, I really should have thought it impossible for him to be in earnest. He may say, perhaps, that labour does not rise as the corn rises. If it does not, the greater ought to be our sorrow; for, we well know, that, then, the hardships of the labourer must be increased. The fact, however, is so; but, then, another fact, is, that, though the corn-grower does not pay an immediate increase of wages in proportion to the increase of the price of his corn, yet, what he does not pay in an immediate increase of wages, he is sure to pay in an increase of amount in his poor-rates. One way or the other the increase he must pay; for, the labourer never receives more than is sufficient for his subsistence, and that sufficiency the corn-grower must supply, or else the labourer ceases to exist, and, of course, the labour ceases with him. But, here I shall be told, perhaps, that a similar course of reasoning will apply to the concerns of the *sugar-growers*; and so it would, if they were left to dispose of their property as they might choose; if there were no tax or restraint, whether as to its destination or its use. With them *substitution* is impossible. They must raise sugar, or nothing; and they are compelled to bring it to one market, where, too, whatever may be the price of it, they are compelled to pay the same duty. Hence the necessity of laws and regulations without end; hence the ruin of hundreds of opulent planters; hence the uncertainty of their affairs; and hence that state of distress, to which many of them are now reduced. Nothing can be more mischievous to the community, generally speaking, than the turning of corn into spirituous liquors; and this evil would, at any rate, be lessened by the use of sugar instead of corn in the making of those liquors. Thus would our colonies be made to add to the quantity of food in the mother country; and to see such a measure opposed upon the ground of its *injuring the growers of corn* would be scandalous indeed; would be a shocking disgrace to the heads as well as to the hearts of the country gentlemen.—II. The *Uti Possidetis*. These are two words, which have been repeated upwards of three hundred and eighty

times, during the debates, in both Houses, upon the papers relative to the late negotiation. In America, where they pay their members so much a day, when present and upon duty, they would have most bitterly complained of the expense of such debates; but we, happy, thrice happy we! have no ground for any such complaint: for, except in the mere trifling article of candles, perhaps, our members cost us just as much at one time as at another. The "*Uti Possidetis*" mean, the *learned* tell us, *actual possession*; or *the state of actual possession*; and, when they talk about treating upon the basis of the "*Uti Possidetis*," they mean, that the parties agree, by way of preliminary, or first bargain, that each shall retain all that he possesses at the moment when the negotiators meet. But, if this be the meaning of the "*Uti Possidetis*," why not give us that meaning in our own language at once? Do those who make use of such phrases, which the stupidest wretch upon earth might learn to use as well as they, in a few hours; nay, which a parrot would learn, or which a high-dutch bird-catcher would teach to a bull-finch or a tom-tit, in the space of a month; and do they think, in good earnest, that this last relick of the mummerly of monkery, this playing off upon us of a few gallipot words, will make us believe that they are *learned*? Learning, truly so called, consists in the possession of knowledge and in the capacity of communicating that knowledge to others; and, as far as my observation will enable me to speak, what are called the *learned* languages, operate as a bar to the acquirement of real learning. I already hear some pedagogue, or pedant, exclaim: "this is precisely the reasoning of the Fox without a tail." But, to bring this matter to the test, I hereby invite the *learned* gentlemen of the two universities to a discussion upon the subject. *I assert that what they call the LEARNED LANGUAGES are improperly so called; and that, as a part of general education, they are worse than useless.* Two months will afford time enough for any of the gentlemen just spoken of to disprove these positions. I will, therefore, give them until Lady Day next. I will publish their defence of their calling; and, if I do not *fairly* beat them in the controversy, and, that, too, in the space of twenty columns of my Register, I will then beg their pardon, and will allow, that to be able to speak, or write, in a language which the people do not understand is a proof of learning. But, until then, I shall dissent from the opinion, that none but clear streams are shallow, and that the muddier the water the deeper the

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well.—To return now to the political topic before us; it seems, from the whole of the published debates upon it, that, had there been no such pretty words to be brought into play, there could have been nothing to talk about which the public would have been able to bestow one moment's attention upon; for, of what importance was it, in such a negotiation, whether such was the basis or not? Every one must know, that, long before a treaty could have been concluded, there must have been cessations or surrenders, on our part, or, that we could have obtained nothing from France in behalf of any other state; and, if such was the case, of what consequence was it, of what use was it, to have settled this mere form of a basis? The ministers, for what reason I know not, and I cannot imagine, insist that they did begin to negotiate upon this basis; and, their opponents contend, as a matter of course, that they did not. Very little interest has, however, been excited by the dispute, every man of sense clearly perceiving that the point at issue was not of the smallest importance, and, at the same time, reflecting with sorrow and with shame, that while we were spending our time in such quibbles, like Milton's fallen angels, sitting upon the burning marle, wrangling about predestination and free-will, our enemy was carrying his triumphant arms over newly-conquered states and kingdoms. The "*Ūti Possidetis*" could not charm down; it was not a spell strong enough to stifle this reflection; and, on hearing the gallipot phrase echoed from side to side, it was impossible that it should not occur to the mind of every man, that, between the two, we had been brought to our present situation; the only question, with us, being, not which had done us most good, but which had done us least injury; which had had the smallest share in producing the ruin and the disgrace of our country; a question which most men will, I think, decide in favour of the present ministers, who must work day and night for whole years, before they will be able to accomplish a hundredth part of the mischief accomplished by Pitt and his minions.—In the debate attributed to the House of Commons there was considerable interest excited by Mr. Whitbread's differing from the ministers, and even proposing an amendment to the address. "*The Opposition*," as the Morning Chronicle calls them, dealt in more cavilling; but, in the objections of Mr. Whitbread there was something of reason and solidity. "*The Opposition*" said the ministers had been "*duped*;" one of them said, they had been "*bamboozled*;"

they all said, that no negotiation should have been entered into; that no belief should have been given to "*such men as Buonaparté and Talleyrand*;" that it was fortunate the negotiation had failed; and that we ought to resolve to be exterminated to the last man rather than treat with Buonaparté until he relinquished his determination *not to suffer us to have any connection with the continent*. But, Mr. Whitbread was of opinion, that there were not sufficient grounds apparent for breaking off the negotiation; that, from the moment Mr. Fox became politically dead, an anti-pacific spirit began to appear on our part; and that, as matters now stood, the possibility of peace with France seemed to be cut off. He therefore proposed to insert words to the following effect in the latter part of the address to the king: "*To assure his Majesty of the firm determination of that House to co-operate with His Majesty in calling forth the resources of the United Kingdom, for the vigorous prosecution of the war in which this country is unhappily still engaged; and to express to His Majesty an earnest request, that His Majesty will, in his paternal solicitude for his people, as far as may be consistent with the honour of his crown and the interests of his Kingdoms, afford every facility to the restoration of the blessings of peace.*" —This amendment ought, in my opinion, to have been adopted; and, my Lord Howick must excuse me, if I think his closing argument, to wit, that one man's blaming ministers for too much readiness to make peace and another's blaming them for too much readiness to break off the negotiation, was a *proof* that ministers had acted wisely, had no force at all in it, and was nothing more than one of those old Pitt-quirks, by which, with the aid of a place and pension majority, his Lordship's solid arguments had been so many times answered. What were the opinions of Mr. Perceval to Mr. Whitbread? Suppose I knock my neighbour down without sufficient provocation, and a man still more violent than myself blame me for not splitting his skull, while another man blame me for having struck him at all: am I to plead the contradictory opinions of these men as a proof that I have acted wisely and justly?—As to the matter itself: what, I should like to know, can possibly be gained by reviving the big talk of Pitt? He hectorred about carrying on war for ever, rather than suffer Buonaparté to exclude us from all connection with the continent; but, he could quietly slip out of place, under false pretences,

while peace was made by others, giving up all the objects, for which he had pledged himself to contend.—For my part, I am thoroughly convinced, that the Emperor will, as long as our system of taxing continues, agree to no terms of peace which shall not be, in his conviction, calculated to work for our destruction as rapidly, and even more rapidly, than war. Never, in my opinion, as long as that system lasts, will England know an hour of real peace. But, of what use are high-sounding words, without deeds therewith corresponding? And, as it may become advantageous to obtain even a short cessation of arms, why should not the way to negotiation be kept open? There is nothing, whether as to its effect at home or abroad, worse than being compelled to recede, either in one's conduct or one's words; and, I am greatly deceived, if Lord Howick expects to be able to keep the ground, upon which he now stands, or affects to stand, with respect to France. I am for no disgraceful terms of peace; but, to talk of *recovering the continent* is now madness; and I would be willing to make peace immediately, leaving Napoleon to take what he pleases in Germany, in Poland, and in Italy, Sicily included. I know of no treaty of alliance, that we have with Sicily. I know of no reason, whether of justice or of policy, for our carrying on war a day for Sicily any more than for Hanover. I would give up nothing that should tend, in anywise, to weaken ourselves; but, I would make not the smallest sacrifice for Russian or any other connection. There was a state of things, in which such connections were amongst our best means of defence as well as of offence against our most formidable enemy: that state of things, thanks to the Pitts, is completely overturned. There is no longer a trace of it remaining; and yet, these Pitts now call upon us to carry on war, until the last man in England shall be exterminated, rather than give up connections with the continent! If we will give up our maritime rights, or only a part of them, Napoleon will give us a connection with the continent: he will give us Hanover even now, and suffer us to have certain other connections; and, though this would be to sacrifice us to those connections, and to the private feelings and interests belonging to them, I suspect, that *there are persons in this country*; who, upon such terms, would willingly see a treaty concluded to-morrow. This is what, in our negotiations with France, we have to guard against; and, we may be assured, that all the big talk about

our honour has in it, at bottom, nothing more than the wish, if not the settled intention, of sacrificing England to selfish connections; and that, as to the honour of *this* country, it never enters into either the heads or the hearts of those (I mean the news-writers, of course,) who are everlastingly repeating the word.—It was said, in one of these speeches, that the *people* were unanimous in their opinion, that the war ought to be continued. Yes, for the defence and the future safety of England, Scotland, and Ireland; but, to tell them that we are at war for connections with the continent is not the way to make them approve of its continuance; for, while they are perfectly unanimous as to a war for the safety and honour of their own country, they are not much less unanimous in scouting the idea of continuing the war for the sake of the continent, every part of which they plainly see at the foot of the conqueror.—

III. There came out, however, in the course of the debates, some observations, which, as published in the news-papers, are well worthy of our attention. The first that I shall notice relate to Hanover, and I shall give them here, as I find them in the speech published under the name of Lord Grenville, as follows: “Now as to Hanover, this was a *nice and difficult point*, and no misrepresentation should be allowed to go abroad respecting it. Never was the issue of the negotiation connected with its fate. *Never did any interested feeling arise respecting it.* But should it be alienated for *our sake*? What if he thought we owed such a debt as that we acknowledge to Russia, to Sweden, to Naples, *how much higher* the debt we owe to our own sovereign? And surely we would avoid the disgrace of such a sacrifice, which would confound us with those who made such shameful sacrifices to their own fears, or their own interests. Hanover was attacked not as a German territory, not as connected with the Germanic corps, but *solely because France was at war with England*; and while we were invulnerable here, the enemy was determined to *wound us through Hanover*. But to adopt the saying and maxims of a great statesman, it seems to be, that under such circumstances, Hanover should be as dear to us as Hampshire; and whenever it was attacked, for British interest it should be defended by British magnanimity. But the same feelings respecting Hanover prevailed at Paris as here; from the first moment of the negotiation it was resolved it should be restored

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“lawful sovereign. Indeed it was needless to do otherwise; for they well knew that British honour *would never have consented to surrender it.*”—Now, I do not say, that Lord Grenville uttered these words, and I comment upon them because I find them published in a news-paper; and because I am convinced that they express doctrines, which, if adhered to, *must* accomplish the extinguishment of the remains of English liberty. *Who* the “great statesman,” alluded to, is, I know not; but, be he who he may, widely do I differ from him in feeling and in opinion; and, whatever may be the feelings of the author of this publication, I can assure him, that Hampshire will think itself as little indebted to him as to Lord Temple. Hanover as dear to us as Hampshire! To *him*, to this author it may be; but, for my part, I trust I should be ready to shed my blood to the last drop rather than see the latter a department of a vassal kingdom of France, while I have no scruple to say, I care just as much about the former, as I do about the Duchy of Brunswick or the Principality of Hesse. Hanover as dear to us as Hampshire! I know not what the people in the North may think of this; but it really and literally comes home to my fire-side; and a great consolation it must be to one to hear, that one is considered, by this author, as having no greater claims upon the government than a Hanoverian hero!

—When the people of England, with the king which they had introduced at their head, made the settlement of the crown of this realm upon the family that now wear it, they made the provision recited in my motto. The makers of that law foresaw the consequences that would unavoidably result from leaving it in the power of the crown to make war for foreign possessions, belonging solely to the king; and, the fair construction of the law is, that war should not be waged by this country, without *previous* consent of Parliament, for the sake of any foreign possessions, the private property of any prince sitting upon this throne, whether he were then born abroad, or whether he should thereafter be born in England. The words, “not being a *native* of this kingdom,” applied immediately to the then expected successor of Queen Anne; but, they also applied to his descendants. They applied to him as the head of the house; but the provision made part of the compact with his successors as well as with himself. The doubtful expression of “in *case* the crown should hereafter come, &c. &c.” was used, because it was not, at the time the act was passed, certain that Queen Anne

would die without children; and, the whole tenor of the act clearly shows, that the object of the provision was, to prevent this nation from being involved in wars for the sake of dominions, the property of the prince, and totally separate in interest from the kingdom of England. Yet, we now have been at war for Hanover, and that the previous consent of parliament was not obtained we all well know. Nay, if the French had stood out, we are plainly told by this author, that we should have been at war for Hanover now, and *solely* for Hanover; for, that, under such circumstances, *Hanover is as dear to us as Hampshire!* And, what are these circumstances? Is there any thing peculiar in them? Were we in alliance with Hanover? Had that gallant and generous nation lent us any aid, either in men or in money, previous to its being conquered? No: this is not pretended. There is no pretext of obligation, either express or tacit, set up. The circumstance (for there is but one) is, “Hanover was conquered *because France was at war with England.*” Well, and will not Hanover *always* be conquered under similar circumstances? And must we make war (or *continue war*, which, in effect, is the same thing) against France every time she conquers Hanover? And, must we never make peace without obtaining the restitution of Hanover, cost what it may? During the *last* war Hanover as well as England was engaged against France; but Hanover thought proper to make peace without consulting us, or our interests. Then it was loudly and vehemently contended by Lord Grenville and the whole of the ministry, that Hanover, though his Majesty, our gracious king, was the sovereign of it, was, and ought to be regarded as a state totally separate from, and having no connection whatever with, the kingdom of Great Britain; and, I remember well, that when some persons, amongst whom was Mr Sheridan, regretted that the pacific example of the Elector of Hanover was not followed by the King of Great Britain, they were called Jacobins and Levellers! But now, behold, when Hanover is conquered; when France has gotten complete possession of it; or when she has given it to another power; now we are to fight and pay for it; now we are “not to give it up;” now we are to look upon it, in short, as being as near and dear to us as one of the counties of England! We are never to have peace without obtaining a restitution of it, because—because what?—“because France took it on account of her war with England.” And an undoubted right she had

so to do; for she was at war with our sovereign and with *all* his subjects and states, wherever they might be. But, Hanover being a sovereignty distinct from England, England was not bound, and is not bound, to obtain restitution, or to do any thing for the safety or deliverance of Hanover. The sovereign may, out of his foreign means, do what he pleases in this way; but with his other dominions we have nothing to do. This is the very case provided for in the act of settlement. It was foreseen, and, indeed, it was easy to foresee, that France would, when at war with our sovereign and his dominions, make war upon his other dominions as well as these; and, therefore, such a law was passed, as was thought sufficient to guard this country against the expence and blood attending the defence of those other dominions. It may be said, that it is hard that the King and his family should lose those dominions for ever, merely because England is at war with France. There is this kingdom in return for that loss. But, at any rate, the probability of such loss, from such causes, was foreseen; and, it was in the power of the King's ancestors to refuse to accept of the crown of England upon the conditions contained in the Act of Settlement.—So much for the *right* of calling upon us to make, or to continue, war, for the defence or restitution of Hanover. Now, for the *policy* of it, leaving the feelings of the people of England out of the question. And here I shall insert, from the *Courier* newspaper, of the 30th ult. some observations, which were mentioned in my last sheet, and which, in a manner better than I could, perhaps, fully express my sentiments upon the subject. They are worthy of the greatest attention; and, I hope the reader will, as I do, bestow upon them not the less applause, because they are taken from a publication which has been too much the slave of those, who have been chiefly instrumental in producing the present state of things. “The recovery of Hanover was insisted on with such a pre-eminent desire in the late negociation, that much enquiry is naturally on foot respecting its value to the British Empire, or to the system of Europe. That it is of any value to Britain cannot be shewn; on the contrary, its connexion with this country has been most injurious to our interests on the continent. Treaties have been made at different times with powers, which could have had less the welfare of England in view than the protection of Hanover, and which have led, or threatened to lead, England into wars. But to go no further back than

“the present war, at its commencement
“France could touch our interests in no
“quarter but Hanover. She over-ran it,
“thereby insulting Austria and Prussia,
“bound by treaty to afford it protection.
“Those powers tamely submitted to the insult, and France, emboldened by their pusillanimity, proceeded to make other acquisitions such as Genoa, &c. The war on the continent followed. If Hanover had but a small share in occasioning that war, she was a chief cause of its disastrous consequences. Prussia saw the dangerous ambition of France and would have succoured Austria, had she not been bribed to neutrality by the promise of Hanover. The hopes of gaining Hanover bound Prussia up from the common cause, left Austria at the mercy of France, and Europe fell. France gave Prussia the price of her neutrality, by ceding Hanover, and Prussia joined France in the war against Britain. G. Britain negociated for peace with France, and insisted as a *sine qua non* that Hanover should be restored. France took Hanover from Prussia that she might give it to G. Britain; and thereby provoked Prussia to a war which has annihilated her as a great power. Thus within a year we have seen Hanover neutralize Prussia, enabling our greatest enemy to subjugate our greatest ally. We have since seen it change a powerful friend into an enemy; and, lastly, we have seen it lead to the destruction not only of that powerful friend, but of the whole of our connexions military and commercial in the north of Germany. And what more mischief shall Hanover do to Britain? Is the king of Britain to become a vassal of France like the kings of Wirtemberg, Bavaria, &c.? Is he, like them, to hold territories during the pleasure of the Corsican usurper?—In what other way but as a vassal of France can the king of England hold Hanover, under the present circumstances of Europe? Will he in future be able to make war upon France with the same independence and spirit he formerly did, knowing that Hanover will instantly be seized and pillaged? Mr. Burke says “the sphere of my duties is my country. A patriotic king can have no other country but the one he governs.—Shall we be a vassal of France for a king?—Yes, says you please, says Talleyrand, who once refused Hanover in the negociation, well knowing the influence which through it the French would be likely to obtain over this empire.—Our own king is patriotic to endanger the interests of

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land for the recovery of Hanover, and no doubt would have relinquished all claim to it, had he had wise and spirited advisers to point out the consequences.—Mark the importance into which Hanover is magnified in the course of the negotiation! It is a *sine qua non* forsooth, and apparently the only one. It is spoken of as if it were Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight; as if it were something the possession of which by the enemy annihilated the independence of England.—And, for God's sake, let us know of what use Hanover is to this country besides furnishing some foreign recruits who can be had elsewhere? With all his courtly and servile spirit, on this occasion, to the royal family, could Mr. Fox have made it more? Can his Whig and Tory friends in the Cabinet make it more?—In the approaching discussions on the negotiation, is there a member in parliament who will speak out sturdy truths on this subject? They can abuse one another. One party may lose their places and another get them; but the royal family cannot be changed. By opposition ministers may be supplanted; but who dare provoke the ill will of permanent power?—Never was there a truer prophet! But he has omitted one recent instance of the influence of Hanover. During the late war, when a fleet was sent into the Baltic to break the Northern Confederacy, why were the ships and coast of the Prussian Monarchy unmolested? Had not Prussia joined in that Confederacy? Was she not equally an object of attack with the nations of Denmark, Russia, and Sweden? Was Prussia spared on account of the near connection subsisting between the two courts? If so, supposing the cause of Great Britain to have been just, and her assertion of them politic, justice and her interests were sacrificed to that connection. But, will not every man, who dares think for himself, and who dares say what he thinks, conclude, that our ministry expected Prussia to indemnify herself for any losses, she might experience in the war, by the seizure of Hanover; or, in other words, by taking possession of the private property of the king, whose servants they were?—This instance of the influence of Hanover has been pointed out to me by a correspondent, whose letter I should have inserted, had I not thought, that, upon the whole, the article just quoted from the *Courier* was better calculated for the purpose in view.—There is no necessity for any thing to rouse men's feelings upon the subject. The facts themselves,

fairly stated, are quite sufficient. The man that does not feel from the bare statement, is made of stuff much too base to be moved by any appeals either to his patriotism or to his pride.—As connected with this subject, I cannot, however, help remarking how completely the army seems to be *Hanoverianized*. The best, or most profitable, regiments, have the honour to have for their colonels, some one or other of the Royal Family, upon whom alone English dukedoms have, for many years past, been bestowed, and who also, together with their foreign relations, have no small share of the Order of the Garter. As to these two latter objects I have nothing to say. I am sure no loyal subject, especially if he be a man of sense, will grudge them either dukedoms or stars or garters; but, as to *regiments* and *staff-commands*, I (for here I will speak only for myself) do humbly presume to think, that they ought to take their fair turn with other officers of the army, and ought not to be so promoted, until they have had long experience, or have the recommendation of some distinguished achievement. But, I have wandered from my subject, to wit, the *Hanoverianizing* of the army. The men of some of our regiments of dragoons, especially those of which the princes are colonels, have nothing of the look of Englishmen about them. They are so caped and cloaked and walletted and furred and whiskered, that, upon entering any place where they are, one can hardly help conceiving one's self in a high-dutch garrison. Now, as the daily new-papers tell us, we are going to have two *Yager* regiments, and of this the supple slaves, who convey the intelligence to us affect to be mightily glad! What in the name of all that's servile, does the word *Yager* mean? Is there, you venal scribes, no English word that will do as well? "In this *highly* useful and necessary description of troops the British army, at present, is extremely deficient." *Highly* useful and necessary indeed! And what do *you* know about the *high* usefulness and necessity of *Yagers*? We hired *Yagers* in the American war, as our national debt and taxes now justly remind us. The Americans, who wear no whiskers, held them in utter contempt, and, upon several occasions, they were beaten and driven from their plunder even by the women. The motto which the Americans gave to the German troops was a reversal of the old saying about the value of heads compared to heels; for they insisted, that, with respect to these bearded men, "that one pair of

"heels were worth two pair of heads." When any one goes creeping and unwillingly along, instead of saying, as we do, that he goes as if his legs were tied, or as if he were going to the gallows, the Americans say, that he goes *like a Hessian to battle*.—If, indeed, there be any real improvement, either in discipline or dress, to be taken from the Hanoverian troops, or from the troops of any other country, no man of sense will object to it; but, what improvement is there in disfiguring Englishmen with furs and wallets and whiskers? Just as if to make a man hideous was to make him brave.

"Terror of boys, the breeding woman's curse," such heroes may be; but, be assured, that the troops of Napoleon are not to be intimidated by fierce and ugly faces.—In my next letter to Mr. Windham I shall offer some remarks upon the introduction of Hanoverian troops, as also upon the *expence* which they have already occasioned to this country, and shall remind him of that part of the Act of Settlement which provides against foreigners having any military command in this country.—IV. *The Flourishing state of our Finance*. This topic came up incidentally, during the "*uti possidetis*" debates; and, in a publication, purporting to be the report of a speech made by Lord Hawkesbury, I find the following passage. "Another encouragement for continuing the contest was the flourishing state of the finances. The present system of finance, if justice were done to it, was such as *no country had ever before arrived at*; and if any one had some years ago predicted the existence of that system, it *would have been thought an impossibility*. This was to be ascribed to two causes. The first, for which the country was indebted to his illustrious friend, was the Sinking Fund, the greatest financial measure ever proposed, acted upon, or persevered in. The next, founded on this, was the raising the supplies within the year, a practice restored and improved by a noble viscount opposite to him (Lord Sidmouth.) Here he entered into a variety of calculations and comparative numerical statements, to prove the rapid increase of the Sinking Fund, and the produce of the war taxes, the former of which now amounted to eight millions and a half annually, the latter to 18 millions, and contended if the system was steadily persevered in, and attended with *due economy*; the country in a few years would find, that the Sinking Fund would be equal to the loan required, and this

during war time; so that in war the national debt would be stationary, in peace it would be rapidly liquidating."—I will take some early opportunity of exposing, as far as it is in the power of words to express, the shallowness and folly of this publication. Yes, truly, it would, some years ago, have been thought impossible that such a tax as the Income Tax could have been levied in England! In another part of this sheet the reader will find a letter upon this subject. Can any one deny the truth of its statements? And, if he cannot, is the existence of this tax a fit subject of congratulation? A subject of pride? Is the existence of this tax an encouragement to carry on the war? Is it a people, who have to submit to such a system of taxation, who are to be told of the flourishing state of the public finances? A people who were last year told, that they must move from the first to the second floor; who were told, that such was the state of our fiscal affairs, that there was nothing left but a choice of evils and oppressions? This new tone is by much the most politic; for, to lament the necessity of imposing new taxes to-day, and to grant new pensions to-morrow, involve men in inconsistencies, and expose them to attack. The best way is to shut your ears fast up against the cries of misery; close your eyes to the increasing number of paupers, surround yourself with some three-hundred place-men, pensioners, and expectants, and, with a loud voice, a firm tone, and a glaring Pitt-like stare, swear that the prosperity and happiness of the country never were so great, and are daily increasing; and, if you should be at a loss for a proof, appeal to the number of coaches seen at the Opera house, or in Bond-Street; but be sure to omit the circumstance, that three fourths of these equipages are supported with the public money.—"In a few years" we are to see such wonders wrought in the way of relief! How long, good God! have the people been told this! The Sinking Fund goes on increasing, and *so do the taxes*; and, go on increasing they must, in peace as well as in war; for, we may rest assured, that, if the people of England are to be duped by a talk about the Sinking Fund, the conqueror of Europe is not. He well knows the *real* effects of our financial system; he is well counselled as to the time when those effects will best aid his purposes; and never will he so act as to suffer us to *obtain relief*, until that system is completely annihilated.—The speech, which I have just quoted, does, indeed, include the condition of *economy*; but, then, this is again qualified; "*due*

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"economy; which, I suppose, does not include the taking off of Lord Liverpool's six-thousand-a-year sinecure, not Lord Hawkesbury's four-thousand-a-year sinecure? No: that is not "*due economy*" by any means. Never, I fear, shall we hear this sort of economy proposed! And, yet, it seems madness not to propose it, after the awful examples that we have witnessed. But, this is the way of all governments. They never profit from any examples.—In taking leave of these debates, I cannot refrain from observing, that Mr. Perceval, as it is stated in the newspapers, wished to *adjourn* the debate in the House of Commons: wished to have a second bout at it! One was quite enough, especially as the two Houses discussed the matter upon separate days, thereby giving the public two days' newspapers full. And here, it must be a subject of great satisfaction to perceive, that, though the master talkers are no more, we have no deficiency in point of talking; and that, as speeches, like the ribbons from a Merry Andrew's mouth, are generally estimated by their length, the loss we have experienced in this way will be very little felt.

If I had room, I should here offer some remarks upon the state of things with regard to the *American States*.—I should also remonstrate with *Mr. Spankie*, upon that new doctrine of his, which has, as my readers will see, in my next, attracted the attention of an able correspondent.—The correspondence between *Messrs. Hewlings* and *Whitbread* must not pass unnoticed.—And I regret exceedingly that I have not room for an observation or two upon the attack, made upon Lord Howick by the smoke-dried sot, who is hired by a set of *mercantile speculators* to conduct the *Morning Post*, of which they are the real proprietors; a circumstance, which, while it serves to give us an idea of the state of the daily press, accounts, in no very unsatisfactory manner, for the virulence with which that print has assailed his lordship, merely because he complained, that a body of men, sitting at Lloyd's, have, out of money raised upon the people, and partly collected in the churches in defiance of the law, given a reward to a military commander, for an act of disobedience of orders! I care not whether he has *succeeded*. If he and his men have now been made prisoners, that does not at all alter the case. He was guilty of flagrant disobedience of orders, and he has been rewarded by persons acting upon the same audacious notions. Call us levellers, indeed! These are the true levellers. My readers will bear me witness what pains

I took to awaken the ministry of Pitt and Addington to the dangers that might, and that would, result from this confederation at Lloyd's. I told them in so many words, that, if there should be in place a ministry, whom the Lloyd's men might dislike, they would, in some way or other, convert their fund into opposition purposes. I was much abused by many wicked, and by some weak men; but, I was not silenced; I persevered, until I had made the subject familiar to every one; and I should be a hypocrite if I disguised my satisfaction at seeing my predictions fulfilled.—Mr. Homan's Second Letter in Defence of Mr. Sheridan will be found below.

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES.

The First Number of the Eighth Volume of COBBETT'S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, is ready for delivery. Complete Sets of the Work, from the Commencement in 1803, may be had of the Publisher, R. Bagshaw, Brydges Street, Covent Garden; of J. Budd, Pall Mall; and of all Booksellers and Newsmen. Of whom, also, may be had, the First Volume of COBBETT'S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND, including the period from the Conquest in 1066, to the Death of James the First.

PROPERTY TAX VEXATIONS.

SIR;—So revolting was the Tax upon Income to the feelings of every individual capable of understanding or appreciating the free principles of our Constitution, that, upon its first introduction, the daring mind of Pitt was appalled at the rising indignation of the country. To palliate this mischievous measure, and allay the ferment of the nation, every art was employed—much was said concerning the secrecy to be observed—the disinterestedness of commissioners, who were to receive no salaries—and, when the measure was carried, it has been generally understood, that the commissioners were instructed to exercise their powers with great caution and moderation, that this unconstitutional and arbitrary measure, might, by proper management, pass down. When this odious tax was revived, various alterations were made, chiefly calculated to obviate the objections to exposure of property: with this view, persons of landed and funded property were to have the tax deducted from their dividends and rents, without being compelled to make any return of the same, and thereby exposing the amount of their incomes. But, Sir, the most numerous class of people to whom exposure must be of infinitely more consequence; those who de-

rive incomes from professions, trade, and commercial concerns, are not only liable to all the evils of the former tax, but, to have their most private affairs, exposed and scrutinised with much greater severity, than under the former tax. The papers which they are required annually to fill up, surpass all human ingenuity to understand: indeed, it is hardly possible so to fill them, as to avoid incurring a penalty. It is well known, that under the former tax, although the commissioners, their clerks, surveyors, and inspectors, &c. were sworn to secrecy, it nevertheless, somehow happened, that persons in public companies were able to relate their neighbours' return. So palpable, indeed, appears now the absurdity of recommending us to pay our money into the Bank to preserve secrecy, that few avail themselves of it, but openly make their returns to the collectors.—It is hardly possible to conceive, Sir, the vexation and oppression which the inhabitants of the City of London endure; the idea of secrecy is now exploded—some of the commissioners receive pay, or have lucrative appointments—all delicacy is at an end—the hired informers of government, whether surveyors, inspectors, or by whatever other fashionable appellation they may be called, surcharge without mercy:—these surcharges are made upon mere speculations it not being possible for them to know the nature of a person's concerns or profits, merely by walking by, and looking at his premises. Very few, indeed, of the inhabitants of London have escaped being surcharged one third, one half, and in most cases, double the amount of their return; they must either submit to the injustice of such surcharge (which many do through fear), or give notice of their intention to appeal: in the latter case a printed paper is sent which they are required to fill up, and which must specify such particulars, as very few, from the very nature of trade in general, can possibly comply with, were they so disposed. When they have complied with this part of the ceremony, and returned the paper, they are summoned to attend the commissioners. After waiting, perhaps, for some hours in a room among several trembling fellow sufferers, they are called up to undergo an examination as severe and humiliating as insolvent debtors before commissioners of Bankruptcy; and, perhaps, they must attend several times, and produce other accounts, before they can satisfy the commissioners.—What loss of time, what vexation, anxiety, and degradation, must an innocent man suffer, even should he succeed at last in satisfying these gentlemen he has made a fair return, to whom he must re-

late all the acts of folly, imprudence, extravagance, improvident bargains, improper speculations, &c. he may have run into.—To give you, Sir, some idea of the humiliating condition so large a portion of individuals are reduced to, I herewith subjoin a copy of the paper every appellant is required to fill up.

“ *Property-Act Office, London, 1806.*—

“ Notice having been received at the
“ Office, of your intention to appeal against
“ the assessment made on you by the additional commissioners, under the Act of
“ the 45th of his present Majesty, cap. 49,
“ for the past year, you receive herewith
“ a schedule of particulars, which the commissioners under the authority of the Act
“ require may be answered in writing, and
“ sent under cover to their clerk, endorsed
“ ‘ *appeal* ;’ after which you will have notice whether the commissioners are satisfied therewith.—And you are desired especially to observe that no appeal can be
“ heard, except on a schedule delivered in
“ writing, according to the instructions
“ hereto annexed.—By direction of the
“ commissioners, (Signed)——Clerk.—
“ P. S. If the Schedule is not returned
“ within 24 days from the date of this notice, the assessment will be confirmed.
“ 1st. The amount of the balance of profit
“ and loss, at the settlement in the 3 years
“ preceding the 5th of April, 1805, stating
“ each year separately, viz. 1802, 1803,
“ 1804. If the accounts were adjusted at
“ the end of each year.—2d. If you have
“ not been in trade 3 years, the amount of
“ the balance of such profit and loss accounts as have been taken, whether 1 or 2
“ years.—3d. Whether any deduction from
“ your profit and loss has been made, for
“ interest on capital employed, or on account of interest paid for money or capital borrowed?—4th. Whether any deduction is made from your profits, on account of rent and taxes, and to what
“ amount?—5th. Whether any deduction
“ is made for servants' wages or board, and
“ to what amount?—6th. Whether there
“ are any profits of an uncertain annual value, which are not included in your general account of profit and loss in trade?—
“ 7th. Whether any deduction is made for
“ bad debts, or for doubtful debts unliquidated and to what amount, specifying
“ each year, viz. 1802, 1803, 1804.—residing at——do hereby make oath, that
“ the several answers herein above set forth,
“ and signed by——are true, in every particular, to the best of——knowledge and
“ belief.—Sworn before us,——”

You perceive, Sir, that, when this paper is

filled up and signed, the party, if required, must verify the same upon oath; upon which you would imagine they would be relieved: but what must your astonishment be when you are told, that, the person appealing is not sworn, but, after being heard, is desired to withdraw—in a few minutes called in again, and informed that the surcharge is confirmed. This was done to a friend of mine; and, although he offered to verify this statement upon oath, his affidavit was not taken. This I am well informed is a common practice; whether the Act justifies this conduct I will not say; but, under such inquisition no one is safe: they may not only take 5 or 10 per cent., but all a man possesses from him. A surveyor surcharges—the commissioners confirm the surcharge—the appellant offers to swear, but is refused. Thus is “the subject left without all manner of remedy.” Sir, I have stated some of the severe hardships to which the inhabitants of the city of London are subjected; I might enumerate many distressing particulars; it is not uncommon for individuals to submit to the grossest injustice rather than undergo the vexation of appealing; a friend of mine when he appealed had it noticed to him, that he had a very good coat on his back, and thence inferred he could afford to pay the surcharge. Many instances have come within my knowledge, where persons in insolvent circumstances have returned incomes, and submitted to surcharges to the injury of their creditors, rather than make their situation known: one person I know (to whom I was a large creditor), who was surcharged, and had his goods seized for the payment of the tax; immediately afterwards he became a bankrupt, and his estate has not, and I believe never will, pay 6d in the pound.—Whether the inhabitants of Westminster and other trading places, have been treated with the same severity, I am not sufficiently informed to determine; but, if I may judge from a circumstance that lately occurred to myself, in a village where I occasionally reside during the summer, I should be led to conclude, that the powers vested in the commissioners, surveyors, collectors, &c. are in all places exercised to the full extent, if not exceeded. The circumstance I allude to, happened in the parish of Edmonton; it is well known to the collector that I am there only a small part of the year. On the 4th of November last, after being from home several weeks, I found at my house several papers to be filled up respecting the Property Tax, dated Oct. 8th. I immediately wrote to the collector, that I always entered my pro-

perty in town, except the premises I occupied, (which he well knew). When my note was delivered him, he immediately filled up a summons (which he had by him, with several others ready signed by two commissioners) for me to attend at Enfield, to shew cause why the penalty of 20l. should not be inflicted upon me for not making my return within 21 days. It not being convenient for me to go 16 miles to appeal, and viewing this as a most wanton and vexatious exercise of authority, and that it was irregular to leave summonses ready signed for collectors to fill up at their pleasure, or rather displeasure, I wrote to him to that effect. Whether the matter is to rest here, I have not been informed; but, Sir, are we patiently and without repining, to submit to these most vexatious and grinding measures? Are we quietly to bear these oppressive and inquisitorial impositions? Are we still to be told, that we must make the most painful sacrifices; that we must be driven from the first floor to the second, the second to the third, and the third to the garret; while not a single measure has been adopted for retrenching the public expenditure; no inquiry into past abuses; no redress of national grievances?—*Dec. 29, 1806.—R. W.*

DEFENCE OF MR. SHERIDAN.

TO THE WORTHY AND INDEPENDENT ELECTORS OF THE CITY OF WESTMINSTER.

LETTER II.

Gentlemen;—On the 13th day of September that great statesman, your late ever to be revered representative, Mr. Fox, departed this life. The delicacy of his public and private friends, though they had long expected his dissolution, prevented them from considering who was the person most adapted to the representation of Westminster. At that interval, grief for his irreparable loss monopolized all their feelings, nor was there to be found a man presumptuous enough to point to his fit successor. The public feeling was soon, however, directed to an advertisement from Lord Percy, stating his intentions to stand for Westminster; but public opinion pointed to Mr. Sheridan. He, however, scrupulously avoided any thing like a canvas, but, called on by the unanimous voice of his friends, he determined to attend a meeting convened by public advertisement signed by twelve of the electors, and then to declare the feelings and principles by which his conduct was actuated. This meeting was held on the 18th of September at the Crown and Anchor: it is needless to refer to Mr. Sheridan's speech or the effects it produced, but the following resolutions were

unanimously agreed to by this meeting, the most respectable of the kind ever held; all parties of every description being present.—

“1st. That the right hon. R. B. Sheridan is the most fit and proper person to represent this city in parliament on the present vacancy.” Mr. Sheridan (being present) declined that honour, suggested his reasons for so doing, and declared his intentions to support Lord Percy. It was, thereupon, resolved unanimously, “That this meeting with the highest admiration of his genius and virtues, observe with the deepest regret the resolution which Mr. Sheridan has formed to decline accepting the decided and almost unanimous wishes in his favour.”—On the 16th of September there appeared from Mr. Cobbett, not in his Register, but in the Morning Post, an Address to the Electors, from which I take the following extract. “I warn you against the calamity, the shame, the deep disgrace that await you and your country, if, yielding to venal solicitations of the stewards and butlers of noblemen, you condescend to become the menials of menials, the laquies of laquies, and suffer the populous, the industrious, the public spirited City of Westminster, hitherto considered as the ever-burning lamp of the liberties of England, to be handed to and fro like a family borough—confidently trusting that you will with indignation resist any project for thus extinguishing the fame of your city, and degrading the character of her electors, confidently trusting that when you consider, that it is to you all other free cities and boroughs look for an example, you will tear in rags the gaudy livery now tendered for your backs, confidently trusting that when the question is freedom or bondage, you will suspend all animosities and differences, and act with a degree of energy and unanimity which shall at once and for ever blast the hopes of all those who would make you the instruments of your country’s ruin.” You must perceive, gentlemen, that this address was written by Mr. Cobbett with an evident wish of supporting Mr. Sheridan, whom, he as well as others, supposed, to be a competitor with Lord Percy for the honour of representing your city. Mr. Cobbett’s wishes and feelings are *particularly conveyed* in this address, not one word does he mention against the pretensions of Mr. Sheridan; on the contrary, every *pointed* invective which Mr. Cobbett hurled at Lord Percy must be considered as so many weapons cast by him in support of Mr. Sheridan. You perceive that in this address there

are none of those incontrovertible objections to the pretensions, and dreadful denunciations against the principles of Mr. Sheridan, which he so consistently fabricated and published in his Register since the meeting at the Crown and Anchor, that is from the moment he failed in his attempts to force Mr. Sheridan into a contest with Lord Percy, and the administration containing so many of Mr. Sheridan’s oldest and dearest friends, together with the whole of the Whig party, who were almost to a man engaged to Lord Percy, he had recourse to his Register, that infallible palladium of consistency and truth, and then circulated *his futile efforts to deceive, and his impotent attempts to defame.*—On the 20th of September there appeared an Address to the Electors of Westminster from Mr. Paull, in all the public papers, which was afterwards repeated in another to the Committee of Electors at the Rainbow Coffee House, from which I take the following extract.—“Gentlemen,—I trust that this address from one of yourselves, and one most sincerely attached to the liberty and independence of Westminster (on whose election the eyes of Europe are now rivetted) will not be deemed obtrusive or undeserving of your most serious consideration. I trust, at all events, you will forgive it. Considering, with some of the best disposed characters in the kingdom, that *the fate of the country* in a great measure will be decided by that of *the approaching election*, I presume to put a plain simple question to all those who feel as I do on this most important occasion. Will you elect any person, be his birth or personal accomplishments what they may, to succeed the ever to be lamented, the immortal Mr. Fox, unknown, untried, as a political character, and to say the least of him, a person already returned to parliament by the Grenville family, IN PREFERENCE TO MR. SHERIDAN? If the present glorious opportunity is neglected for asserting the freedom and independence of the first city of the world, England will long, will for ever, lament the unhappy events, and ‘Peace, and the dignified charities of human nature,’ with liberty itself, may be said truly to have been thrown orphans on the world. At the General Election, after having, by his services, still further endeared himself to the hearts of his countrymen, Sir Francis Burdett will not then be debared from returning to those constituents whose partiality he has so justly merited, and to whom his gratitude is due, and you will then have an oppor-

“tunity, *worthy* and *independent* Freemen, to *revert back to* HIM, who has been, as *he OUGHT to have been*, the FIRST OBJECT of YOUR CHOICE—I MEAN TO MR. SHERIDAN, whose conduct on the present occasion (laudable, delicate, and proper, no doubt, as his motives have been) has DIS-APPOINTED EVERY TRUE FRIEND TO LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND INDEPENDENCE. Should Mr. Sheridan UNFORTUNATELY, at the General Election STILL DECLINE your partiality for him, Lord Percy in the mean time, (for he is now in Parliament, by the favour of Lord Grenville), will, in the Senate, have opportunities to prove himself politically worthy of being, what Mr. Fox adjudged as the first distinction in the world, ‘the worthy representative of Westminster.’ I have the honour to subscribe myself, with every sentiment of respect, your faithful servant, JAMES PAULL.”—In these sentiments thus expressed by Mr. Paull, I believe that gentleman was perfectly sincere, and had Mr. Sheridan stood, I have no doubt but that he would have been a zealous supporter and an active canvasser in his behalf.—Now, Gentlemen, what are your opinions respecting this address of Mr. Paull’s when compared with his subsequent addresses and his speeches on the hustings?—Hitherto, then, an unexampled unanimity and unparalleled popularity appeared in favour of Mr. Sheridan as the fit and genuine successor of Mr. Fox. It is curious to trace by what mean arts, or accidents, even the lowest of the rabble, much less many respectable Electors, could afterwards have been turned against him. Mr. Sheridan persevered in his honourable determination not to oppose, but to give all his interest to Lord Percy, the candidate who not only possessed the whole support of the government, but the unanimous promise of the Whig interest, and, of course, of the great majority of the personal friends of Mr. Sheridan. It should appear difficult to find fault with that line of conduct adopted on this occasion by Mr. Sheridan, or to consider it otherwise than as Mr. Paull viewed it; who, in his address which I have already quoted, declares it to be, “laudable, delicate, and proper.” Mr. Cobbett, however, led the way to a new construction of Mr. Sheridan’s motives; he discovered, that the whole was “a juggle between Mr. Sheridan and the Duke of Northumberland,” to whom the former had most ungratefully betrayed and sold the independence of the City of Westminster. From Mr. Cobbett’s 3d. letter to the Electors of Westminster, I take the following passage:

—“It appears clear to me, that from the beginning, he (Mr. Sheridan) was in concert with the Lord and his Steward; that the meeting at Somerset House, and the advertisement for the public meeting, were for the purpose of preventing any other candidate from coming forward against the Lord.”—But now to consider Mr. Cobbett’s conduct relative to the Duke of Northumberland, I shall make a few extracts from his Register, from which you will perceive that this gentleman invariably forms his opinions, and draws his conclusions, from principles which his imagination creates, without the aid of his judgment; and which are as mutable as his opinions. To prove this, I select the following extracts from his Register, Vol. X. page 481: “Even Mr. Sheridan, with all his conduct before me, appears to me greatly preferable to the Lord that has been offered to you;” again, page 484, “Mr. Sheridan’s scheme has not succeeded; you seem not satisfied with his nomination of the Lord; if you must submit, let it for God’s sake be with every mark of reluctance.” Page 548, he says, “would it have been of no use to cause the family of Northumberland to expend sixty or seventy thousand pounds? Would it have been of no use to give nearly one half of you at any rate, an opportunity of shewing your dislike to the man you disapproved of?”—Again, page 552; “excuse me, if I ask you whether you remember how the high-blooded Sire sat smiling at the window while you like beasts of burden, were carrying the son upon your shoulders, and if I reproach you with worse than beastly unreasonableness, if you complain of burdens hereafter.” Then the Duke is charged with having most grossly interfered in the late Election, and of having libelled Mr. Sheridan; as will appear from the following letter, which Mr. Cobbett states to have been written by the Duke of Northumberland to some leading man in the parish of St. Margaret. Register, page 806; “the facts are these; 1st., that Mr. Stephen-son, the vestry clerk of the parish, read to me, *before the election began*, minutes, which he had made in his pocket-book, of the contents of a letter from the Duke of Northumberland, to some leading men in the parish, who, agreeably to the wishes of the Duke, had communicated the contents of the letter to the Churchwardens; which contents as read to me, in substance were, that the Duke was highly offended that the Minister could find no other man than Mr. Sheridan, to

be the colleague of Earl Percy; that he could not bring himself to consent to his son's standing with such a man as Mr. Sheridan. Those minutes," says Mr. Cobbett, "contain expressions beyond all measure more *harsh* than are contained in my account of them; and Mr. Stephenson well knows, that I have kept far within the limits of truth." On the 15th of November, the spirit of the above *flimsy substance considerably enlarged*, and improved with many additions never before published, was placarded on the corner of every street; but it is strange that this circumstance, which was so *conducive to the interests of Mr. Paull*, should have been kept a profound secret until two days before the close of the poll, when we learned from Mr. Cobbett, that he was in possession of the fact previous to the commencement of the Election. The advertisement above alluded to, was the ground on which Mr. Paull's fertile imagination created those 800 imaginary votes, which he pledged himself to bring forward on the following Monday.—Hence it must clearly appear, that the whole of this was an electioneering trick.—I shall now, gentlemen, bring forward an evidence which must effectually confute and invalidate the rash and unfounded assertions of Mr. Cobbett, namely, a letter received by Mr. Sheridan from the Church-wardens of St. Martins, signed also by Mr. Birnie: on this I shall make no comment, as the following letter is incontrovertible.—“Spring Garden Coffee-house, Nov. 16, 1806.—Sir,—In answer to your communication by Mr. A. Johnston, we beg leave to declare, that no kind of influence has been made use of, either directly or indirectly, by the Duke of Northumberland, or any person in his name, in this parish, on the part of Mr. Paull; nor did we ever hear of any letter being sent to the vestry, as is mentioned in the bills posted about the streets last night; nor is it possible such a letter could have been received without our knowledge.—We have the honour to be, Sir,—R. BIRNIE, Chairman of Sir S. HOOD's Committee.—JOHN STATON, Churchwarden.”—Mr. Cobbett himself declares, p. 840. “The conduct of this nobleman, and all the persons acting under him has been during the contest at Westminster, truly *exemplary and constitutional*. They have in no instance that I have heard of, attempted to interfere in the election.” My limits will not allow me to make any remark on this last quotation, and, indeed, the glaring inconsistency of Mr. Cobbett renders any comment of mine

unnecessary. Mr. Cobbett says, p. 842, “A fact has come to light, too, which I have great pleasure in stating, because it will operate as a correction of an error, into which, with many others, I was led with regard to Lord Percy's election, namely, that there had, from the beginning, been a secret understanding between Mr. Wilson and Mr. Sheridan. It now appears from unquestionable authority, that there was no such understanding.” In supposing there ever had been a collusion between the Duke and Mr. Sheridan, how reasonable, it would have been that a man acting under that impression, who had raised a foul and lying cry against Mr. Sheridan, should on the discovery of his error have made apology and atonement, and have endeavoured to repair the mischief he had caused; instead of which, Mr. Cobbett seems totally to have disregarded my letter, p. 556, in which I told him that such a report was too ridiculous to require an answer, and that I was certain he himself did not believe it; and, then, forsooth, when it suits his own purpose two months after, he claims the merit of this discovery, and acknowledges that he has been led into an error; therefore, I hope and trust, for Mr. Cobbett's credit as a man of veracity, that two months hence he will publish a recantation of his present errors, though he may not give me credit for the truths I have advanced, to which I can have no manner of objection.—Gentlemen, I shall give you another proof of Mr. Cobbett's *consistency*. In one Register he tells you of the risk Mr. Sheridan ran in opposing Lord Percy; in the following Register he asserts, there would have been no risk in so doing. In the Register of Sept. 27, p. 483, he says, “There was indeed, a threat thrown out in a ministerial paper, that Mr. Sheridan would *lose his place* if he opposed the Lord, and I am of opinion that such would have been the case.” Again, p. 548, Mr. Cobbett, says, “I am certain that if in such a cause, Mr. Sheridan had had the *courage* to expose his places and his seat, *no minister in England* would have dared to touch either.”—I now come to a strong instance indeed of Mr. Cobbett's sincerity and consistency. On the Tuesday evening previous to the commencement of the election, he wrote to Mr. Sheridan the following letter. “Sir;—To be direct and frank has always been my course, and I think it right to lose not a moment in informing you, that upon hearing that Lord Percy had declined, that a Pittite was to be set up in his stead, and that Mr. Paull meant

“ to offer himself, I immediately set off for
 “ town, to lend this latter gentleman all the
 “ assistance in my power, however trifling
 “ that may be; and, *as the main object of*
 “ *this letter*, I think it right to inform you,
 “ that I am well assured that Mr. Paull *does*
 “ *not mean to be considered as opposed to*
 “ *you*, and, that if there should be any hos-
 “ tility shewn between you, *the fault will*
 “ *not be his*, or *that of his friends*—I am,
 “ Sir, yours, &c.—WM. COBBETT.”—On
 the morning of the very same day on which
 Mr. Sheridan received this letter, Mr. Paull
 addressed to that most active and attached
 friend of Mr. Sheridan, Mr. Finnerty, a let-
 ter as follows: “ Dear Sir;—I am not op-
 “ posing Mr. Sheridan. Mr. Cobbett is at
 “ my house, and we want merely to speak
 “ to you, without attempting, what would
 “ be both improper and useless, to weaken,
 “ in any shape, your attachment to Mr.
 “ Sheridan. We differ, however, with you
 “ totally about our success, I am really and
 “ sincerely yours, JAMES PAULL.”—On
 the 29th of November, appeared in Mr.
 Cobbett's Register, p. 840, the following
 paragraph. “ The cup of his (Mr. Sheri-
 “ dan's) ambition was just touching his lip,
 “ when we came and dashed it to the
 “ ground.” Now, I force Mr. Cobbett
 into this dilemma, and let him take his
 choice upon which horn of it he will remain
 suspended. Was he sincere, and was Mr.
 Paull sincere, or were they not, in their de-
 claration, that it was not their object or de-
 termination to oppose Mr. Sheridan? If
 they were sincere, Mr. Cobbett's vaunt, that
 “ we came and dashed the cup from his lip
 “ to the ground,” is a boastful after-thought
 and a libel on themselves. If they were not
 sincere, then are they convicted of an act of
 base hypocrisy in endeavouring to delude the
 friends of Mr. Sheridan by false professions.
 Let them take their choice. Being on the
 subject of Mr. Cobbett's *sincerity and con-*
sistency, I must here bring another instance
 connected with the present subject. Mr.
 Cobbett has in various parts of his Register
 (notwithstanding the direct proofs to the
 contrary which have been brought forward,
 and the still stronger proofs which, but for
 Mr. Sheridan's delicacy, would have been
 produced) ventured to assert, that the over-
 tures for an understanding with Mr. Paull
 were made on the part of Mr. Sheridan,
 and this he endeavours to establish by his
 statement of Mr. Rodwell's conduct on the
 subject, vide p. 760, in which he affirms,
 there had been an offer made to Mr. Paull
 by Mr. Rodwell, one of Mr. Sheridan's
 committee, on the part of Mr. Sheridan, to

split votes with Mr. Paull. Now, gentle-
 men, observe, that this Mr. Cobbett, having
 inserted with the most frontless intrepidity,
 a gross and foul misrepresentation respect-
 ing Mr. Rodwell's conduct, he absolutely re-
 fused to give a place in his Register to Mr.
 Rodwell's clear and manly reply to the ca-
 lumny, though published in most of the pub-
 lic papers, and which I shall now insert.—
 “ Copy of a letter from Mr. Rodwell to Pe-
 “ ter Moore, Esq. Chairman of Mr. Sheri-
 “ dan's Committee.—Leicester-square, Nov.
 “ 16.—Sir,—In answer to your letter, just
 “ received, I am, in the first place, to in-
 “ form you, that, instead of being one of
 “ the principal persons of Mr. Sheridan's
 “ committee, I do not, and have not attend-
 “ ed it at all; nor have I had the slightest
 “ intercourse with Mr. S. on this business,
 “ except once at the Crown and Anchor,
 “ on the 18th of Sept., and last Sunday in a
 “ public room at the Piazza Coffee-house.
 “ Mr. S. never made, through me, any
 “ proposal of any sort to any person con-
 “ cerned in the election. I avow that my
 “ wish was, as an independent individual
 “ elector of Westminster, to have polled for
 “ Mr. S. and Mr. Paull; and had I had any
 “ intercourse whatever with Mr. S. I should
 “ have taken the liberty, in a fair and man-
 “ ly way, to express to him the opinion I
 “ have before professed; but I was pre-
 “ vented from attempting any communica-
 “ tion with him, by the advice of a gentle-
 “ man who is really one of the principal
 “ persons of his committee (I mean Mr.
 “ Burgess, Mr. Sheridan's solicitor), and
 “ who assured me that Mr. S. would not
 “ listen to such proposition, I afterwards vo-
 “ ted singly for Mr. S. The letter I wrote
 “ to Mr. Paull, was not on the day of Mr.
 “ Sheridan's declared union with Sir S.
 “ Hood, but on the evening of the Sunday
 “ preceding the day of nomination. I have
 “ since explained to Mr. Cobbett his mis-
 “ take on the subject, and he has promised
 “ to correct it in his next number. I now
 “ conclude with observing, that I do not
 “ feel myself called upon to make the least
 “ apology for the part I have taken. Pre-
 “ vious correspondence and communication
 “ with Mr. Paull justified my writing to
 “ him in the manner I did; and as an elec-
 “ tor of independent mind and spirit, I had
 “ a right to act for, and to judge whom I
 “ would prefer to be the colleague of Mr.
 “ S. I have the honour to be, Sir, your
 “ obedient servant, T. RODWELL.”—
 Having now, gentlemen, arrived at the li-
 mits which Mr. Cobbett allotted to me in
 this number, I must defer till my next the

many instances I can bring forward, to prove that Mr. Cobbett's libels on Mr. Sheridan during the late election, are as groundless and unsubstantiated, as I trust you are now convinced his attacks on Mr. Sheridan's conduct were with respect to Lord Percy's election.—I have the honour to be, gentlemen, your very obedient humble servant,—
Monday, Jan. 5, 1807.—FREDERICK HOMAN.

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPER.

CONTINENTAL WAR.—*Fifth Bulletin of the Grand French Army.*

Jena, October 15. —The battle of Jena has wiped away the disgrace of the battle of Rosbach, and in seven days concluded a campaign, which has wholly quieted all the dreadful preparations for war, with which the Prussian heads were so much possessed.—The following was the position of the army on the 13th: The Grand Duke of Berg and Marshal Davoust were with their corps of the army at Naumburg, having a part at Leipzig and Halle. The corps of Marshal Prince Ponte-Corvo was on the march to come up to Naumburg. The corps of Marshal Lannes advanced to Jena; the corps of Marshal Augereau was placed in the position of Kahla.—The corps of Marshal Ney was at Rotha. The head quarters were at Gera. The Emperor was on the march to proceed to Jena. The corps of Marshal Soult was on the march from Gera, to take a more convenient position upon the strait road from Naumburg to Jena.—The position of the enemy was the following: The King of Prussia wished to commence hostilities on the 9th of October, by bearing down his right wing on Frankfort, with his centre on Wurtzburgh, and his left wing on Bamberg. All the divisions of his army were disposed for the accomplishment of this plan; but the French army, turning him upon the extremity of his left wing, was found in a few days at Saalburg, at Lobenstein, at Schleitz, at Gera, and at Naumburg. The Prussian army, seeing itself turned, occupied the days of the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th, in calling in their detachments; and, on the 13th, formed itself into order of battle between Capelsdorf, being about 150,000 men strong.—On the 13th, at two o'clock in the afternoon, the Emperor came to Jena, and on a small elevated flat, beset by our advanced guard, reconnoitred the positions of the enemy, in order to manœuvre in such a way as next day to force the different passes on the

Saal, and so to fall on. The enemy made a vigorous opposition, and seemed by their dispositions, on an inaccessible position on the highway between Jena and Weimar, to think that the French could not stretch out upon the plain without previously forcing that passage. It did not appear possible, in fact, to bring the artillery to play upon the flat, which, was so small, that four battalions could scarcely open out their ranks upon it.—The men were set at work the whole night, to make a way over the ruts, and at length, succeeded in bringing the artillery upon the height.—Marshal Davoust received orders to defend the passes near Naumburg and the defiles of Koefen, as the enemy wanted to march upon Naumburg, in order to reach Apolda, and fall upon his rear, in case he remained in the situation in which he then was.—The corps of Marshal Prince Ponte-Corvo was destined to stretch out by Naumburg, in order to fall upon the rear guard of the enemy, in case he bent strongly toward Naumburg or Jena.—The heavy cavalry, which had not yet come up with the army, could not be entirely brought on by mid-day. The cavalry of the imperial guard was at the distance of 36 hours march, notwithstanding the heavy journey which it had performed since it left Paris; but it was come to that moment of the war, when no single consideration should outweigh to deprive them of the advantage of being the first to meet and fall upon the enemy.—The Emperor placed the whole corps of Marshal Lannes in order of battle upon the level height, which the enemy seemed to overlook—(they occupied a position over against it). This corps was placed under the care of General Victor; each division formed a wing. Marshal Lefebvre ordered the imperial guard into a square battalion upon the highest point. The Emperor kept the watch in the midst of his brave men. The night presented a remarkable spectacle: two armies, the one of which extended its front upon a line of six hours march, fired the air with its lights; the other, the lights of which seemed to be brought into one small point; and in the one, as well as in the other, all watchfulness and motion. The lights of the two armies were at half-cannon shot distance respectively; the sentinels were almost touching, and there was not a single motion on either side, which could not be heard from the other.—The divisions of Marshals Ney and Soult took up the whole night in marching.

To be continued.